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SECURITIES REGULATION-
RULE 10b-5: DEVELOPMENT OF AN INQUIRY NOTICE STANDARD
OF CONDUCT IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the objectives of rule 10b-5,1 promulgated pursuant to § 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 is to prevent material misstate-
ments or omissions in investment information. While it is clear that a
private action for damages will lie under rule o1b-5,3 a "great debate"
has developed over the proper test to apply to the conduct of corporate
personnel in determining whether liability should attach when misstate-
ments or omissions occur.4 Although at least one federal court of
appeals has suggested the establishment of strict liability under rule 10b-
5,5 the debate focuses primarily on the acceptibility of a negligence stan-
dard as opposed to a requirement of scienter, or some degree of knowl-
edge as to the existence of misstatements or omissions. This note traces
the development of the standard of conduct in the Second Circuit. In
doing so it identifies the emergence of an inquiry notice standard-one
which leads to liability if the defendant has been placed on inquiry no-
tice as to possibility of material misstatements or omissions and fails to
investigate and disclose necessary information with reasonable care. The
note also attempts a critical analysis of the various considerations em-
ployed by the Second Circuit in arriving at the establishment of an in-
quiry notice test.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE 1OB-5 STANDARD
OF CONDUCT IN THE SECOND Cmcurr
In analyzing and interpreting the scienter standard which the Second
Circuit purports to establish, it is helpful to trace the history of the rule
lob-5 standard of conduct within the circuit. The development can ef-
fectively be divided into three stages: (1) the apparent move from a
position which would require common law fraud for liability to the ac-
ceptance of a negligence test in private rule 10b-5 actions for damages;
117 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as rule 10b-5).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as § 10(b)].
3 See, e.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951).
4 See Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1290 (2d Cir. 1969), vhich
discusses this 'great debate."
5Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961). See dso White v. Abrams, 42
U.S.LW. 2518 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 1974).
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(2) the uncertain retreat from the negligence standard; and (3) the
establishment of the principle of inquiry notice.
A. From Fraud to Negligence
The initial position assumed by the Second Circuit on the proper stan-
dard of conduct in rule 10b-5 private actions for damages was that es-
poused in Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg, Co.0 In Fischman the court ad-
hered to the traditional common law requirement that actual fraudulent
intent must be proved to effect recovery in private actions for damagesO
The court did not consider the possibility that a less strict standard might
be more appropriate. Although the Second Circuit had modified this
position somewhat by 1967, and had spoken of "some form of the tra-
ditional scienter requirement,"" no specific test had been established to
replace the strict fraud standard.
The Second Circuit significantly departed from a fraud or modified
fraud-scienter position in private rule 10b-5 actions for damages in the
landmark case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (TGS). The TGS
court held that in future actions by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission for "equitable or prophylactic" relief, negligent conduct would
constitute a violation of rule lob-5.10  A fraud or modified fraud-
scienter standard would not be required in such a suit. The holding did
not involve a private rule 10b-5 action for damages. Nevertheless the
court proceeded to suggest a perhaps more significant ramification in the
development of rule lob-5. The majority opinion strongly urged that
negligence should also constitute a sufficient basis for relief in a private
action for damages." The court stated:
A similar standard [of negligence] has been adopted in private actions
... for policy reasons which seem perfectly consistent with the broad
Congressional design ".... to insure the maintenance of fair and honest
markets... in securities transactions.
[Tjhe securities laws should be interpreted as an expansion of the
common law .. . to effectuate the broad remedial design of Congress.
... Moreover, a review of other sections of the Act from which Rule
iob-5 seems to have been drawn suggests that the implementation of a
standard of conduct that encompasses negligence as well as active fraud
6 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
7Id. at 786.
8 Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1967).
9 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
loId. at 854-55.
1lid. at 855.
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comports with the administrative and the legislative purposes of the
Rule."32
This dicta was interpreted by many commentators to mean that those
responsible for disseminating information to the investing public would
be obligated to investigate matters which might prove material in mak-
ing an investment decision, and to disclose the information in a manner
that would not be misleading. 3 Liability would arise if the duty was
not performed with reasonable care. Imposing such an affirmative duty
to investigate was a significant break with the past since it was the first
time that actual knowledge of the misstatement or omission had not
been necessary to trigger liability in a private suit for damages. This de-
parture was quite abrupt in that it bypassed a middle position which
would have required some form of constructive knowledge for liability
to arise in rule 10b-5 private damage actions. The element of knowl-
edge, however, has no relevance to a negligence standard of conduct.
B. The Retreat from Negligence
The TGS pronouncement that negligence would violate the rule lob-
5 standard of conduct was not to stand for long in the Second Circuit.
The series of cases following TGS evidenced a break from the negligence
test as well as a continuing struggle within the Second Circuit over the
correct test to apply to conduct in a rule 10b-5 private action for damages.
Shortly after TGS, the Second Circuit avoided an opportunity to af-
firm negligence as its standard in private rule 10b-5 damage actions in
Heit v. Weitzen.14  Dealing only with the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
121d. (Citations omitted).
ISSee, e.g., VI I.. Loss, SECURIES REGULATION 3887-88 (2d ed. 1969) (indicating
that the Second Circuit watered down the scienter requirement in TGS-following the trend
among the circuits); 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAuD-SEC RULE 1OB-5, §§ 8.4
(504), 8.4(506)(1971); Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privily and Seta
of Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sales Cases, 63 NW. U.1. REV. 423, 444-46 (1968).
Three basic alternatives were given in Comment, Negligent Afisrepresentatlion Under
Rule lOb-5, 32 U. Cm. - RE v. 824, 827 (1965).
(1) absolute liability-the fact that the statements made were false or misleading
is sufficient to establish liability regardless of the defendant's state of mind; (2)
intentional liability-the falke or misleading statements must have been made
knowingly or with intent to mislead; (3) negligence liability-the defendant will
not be liable if he was unaware of the deception and could not have cured it by the
exercise of reasonable care.
Following (1) see, e.g., Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir.
1962); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). Following (3) see, e.g., Mitchell
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971); Clement A. Evans & Co. v.
McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 US. 988 (1971); City
National Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 229-30 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905
(1970); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
For a comparison of the circuits see A. BROMBERG, supra, § 8A(585).
14 402 F.2d 909, 913-14 (2d Cir. 1968).
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complaint, the court in Heit found that the plaintiff's allegations that
defendants "knew or should have known" of material misinformation
properly stated a claim for relief. 5 The alternative allegations were suf-
ficient to cover both knowledge of the misstatements and negligence in
failing to investigate, and consequently were sufficient as a matter of
pleading."8
Conspicuously absent from the Heit discussion was language to rein-
force the TGS suggestion that negligence alone would be sufficient in a
private action for damages. The Heit court noted that the TGS lan-
guage was dicta and that the "troublesome question" of the establish-
ment of a negligence as opposed to a scienter standard had yet to be de-
cided.17 Although the language in TGS did constitute dicta, the TGS
court expressed no doubt over the position it would take should an occa-
sion arise in which a definite holding was necessary. The Heit discus-
sion therefore fell as a warning that, despite previous indications to the
contrary, the Second Circuit might decide against a negligence standard
and in favor of a scienter requirement in a private rule 1ob-5 action for
damages when directly confronted with that issue.
Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc.,'8 which followed Heir, also in-
dicated that the scienter issue was not yet decided, while also avoiding
an affirmation of any specific standard. The defendants in that case re-
quested the trial judge to charge the jury that to find for the plaintiffs it
must conclude that the defendants intended to defraud plaintiffs.1" The
trial judge rejected this request, which called for a standard of conduct
requiring actual fraud. He likewise rejected the TGS suggestion that
negligent conduct on the part of the defendants would be sufficient to
state a valid claim for relief. The judge charged that some form of
scienter-more than mere negligence-must be demonstrated for plain-
tiffs to recover in the private rule 10b-5 action for damages.20
On appeal the Second Circuit agreed with the trial judge that a
"scienter requirement equal to the 'intent to defraud' required for com-
mon law fraud" was no longer necessary in a rule 10b-5 action. How-
ever, the court made no determination as to the correctness of the in-
struction given by the trial court that negligence would not satisfy a valid
claim for relief; it merely stated that even if negligence were the correct
15 Id. at 914.
a6id.
17Id. at 913-14.
Is 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
1ld. at 1290-91. The requested charge would require actual fraud and is similar to
the standard upheld in Fischman, supra note 7 at 786.
20 418 F.2d at 1290-91.
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standard, a negligence charge would have weighed more heavily against
the defendants than the charge given by the trial judge requiring some
form of scienter. Thus, since the defendants lost at the trial level, the
charge contained no prejudicial error.*1  The court also indicated that
the issue of negligence versus scienter was not yet settled, terming the
dispute "the great debate."- -'
The Second Circuit at last clearly repudiated the negligence standard
in a private action in Shemtob v. Shearson. Hamnimill & Co.23  There it
required that the plaintiff allege facts indicating scienter, intent to de-
fraud, reckless disregard for the truth, or knowing use of a device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud. Allegations of "mere negligence" did
not, held the court, state a claim for relief under rule 1ob-5. -' Finally,
therefore, the uncertainty over whether or not the Second Circuit would
adopt a negligence test in a private rule 10b-5 action for damages had
been settled. Some form of scienter-more than mere negligence-was
now necessary for liability to attach within the Second Circuit.
C. The Establishment of Inquiry Notice
The series of cases from TGS to Shemtob illustrates the retreat by
the Second Circuit from a negligence standard in private rule lob-5 ac-
tions for damages."-5 The precise test that was established cannot, how-
ever, be dearly discerned from these cases. Consequently the focus in
the Secdnd Circuit has shifted to the establishment of a specific standard
by which to measure a defendant's conduct in a private rule 10b-5 ac-
tion.
The initial step by the Second Circuit in its attempt to arrive at a pre-
cise determination of its scienter requirement was taken in Cohen v.
21 Id. at 1291.
22 'Thus, whatever the outcome of the great debate over ordinary negligence versus
sdenter in private actions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,
.. . it is dear that . . . [the] instruction satisfied the scienter requirement imposed by prior
cases." Id. at 1291.
23448 F.2d 442 (2crCir. 1971).
24 Id. at 445.
2 5 judge Friendly's concurring opinion in TGS, which argued that private plaintiffs
should be required to allege some form of scienter, provided the basis for the court's retreat
from the TGS majority negligence standard. 401 F.2d at 866-69. Three judges concurred
with Judge Friendly on that issue and two judges dissented from the majority. Thus, only
four members of the nine-member court actually favored a negligence position. See Heit
v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1968) (referring to Judge Friendlys concurring
opinion in TGS); and Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir.
1968) (citing pages in TGS which fell within Judge Friendly's concurring opinion). The
subsequent confusion in the Heir-Shemiob series of cases implies a struggle among the oppos-
ing factions of the court to promote their prospective positions.
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Franchard Corp °20 This case itself did not clearly indicate which stan-
dard the court was adopting. Nevertheless, the decision in, Franchard,
when analyzed in light of a subsequent case, Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,"1
suggests that the court has begun to focus on an acceptable standard,
1. Cohen v. Franchard Corporation
Franchard involved a real estate scheme whereby a partnership (As-
sociates) was formed to purchase one apartment building and the land
upon which to build another; Franchard Corporation was engaged to
maintain Associates' financial records. To raise necessary capital, pro-
motional material was issued by the general partners to encourage the
purchase of limited partnership shares. This material advertised a pro.
jected return on investment based upon a net lease which had been ne-
gotiated with a lessee company, also controlled by the general partners,
but it failed to disclose the financial condition of the net lessee. Subse-
quent to the issuance of the limited partnership shares, the lessee filed a
petition for an arrangement under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act
and was evicted. A new net lessee agreed to pay a price far below the
original net lease price, thereby lowering the return on investment.
Finally the partnership was dissolved."8
Purchasers of limited partnership shares believed that Franchard Cor-
poration and the general partners of Associates had defaulted upon an
obligation to investigate and disclose pertinent financial information
which would have warned investors of the net lessee's financial difficulties.
They initiated a class action on behalf of all limited partners, alleging
violations of § 10(b) and rule lob-5. 9
The trial court rejected the purchasers' request for a "mere negli-
gence" charge and charged the jury that "reckless disregard for the truth"
must have been established in order for the plaintiffs to recover.80 On
appeal the Second Circuit held that the trial court's "charge on scienter
was essentially correct.' 13  The Second Circuit nevertheless appeared con-
fused in Franchard and did not clearly indicate the precise standard of
conduct which it was adopting. The court's language could be inter-
preted as requiring either (1) a standard between fraud and negligence
(some form of knowledge or scienter); (2) a standard close to common
law fraud (reckless disregard for the truth); or (3) a standard of negli-
20478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1973).
27 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
28 478 F.2d at 117-20.
29 Id. at 119, 120-21, 123.
ao Id. at 123.
311d. at 124.
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gence (reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of material mis-
statements or omissions).
First, it may be inferred from Franchard that some form of scienter
is necessary for rule lob-5 liability. After the court stated that it had
uniformly held in the past that a party could not be found liable for
"mere negligent conduct" under rule 10b-5, it announced that for liabil-
ity to attach the defendant must to some extent be cognizant of a mis-
statement or omission; he must possess some degree of knowledge.-
The court then referred to the ALI Federal Securities Code definition of
"knowledge" which comprises (a) actual knowledge, and (b) construc-
tive knowledge, by which knowledge can be inferred. 3 Constructive
knowledge, according to the code, includes "reckless disregard for the
truth" as well as 'the case of a defendant who is honestly convinced
of the truth of the statement... but knows that the person with whom
he is dealing will assume ... a dearly more reliable source for his be-
lief." The definition of knowledge then would appear to parallel
the court's "some form of scienter" requirement.
Second, the Franchard court appeared to adopt a standard close to
common law fraud by accepting the trial judge's charge, which required
proof of reckless disregard for the truth before liability could arise.35
As has been discussed above, the ALI definition of knowledge goes be-
yond reckless disregard for the truth. Therefore, by using this reckless
disregard for the truth language, the court severely limited the construc-
tive knowledge test implicitly adopted by use of the ALI definition.
Reckless disregard comes very close to a return to the "fraud" require-
ment espoused in Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,36 since an action for
common law deceit (fraud) encompasses reckless disregard for the
truth, which can be either a belief that a statement is untrue or a total
lack of belief that it is true.37  Reckless disregard for the truth is com-
S2/J. at 123.
33 Id. at 123 n.11.
ALI Federal Securities Code, § 251A (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973):
[Knowledge.) When reference is made to this section, a misrepresentation is known
by a person to be a misrepresentation if he (a) knows or believes that the matter is
otherwise than represented, (b) does not have the confidence in its existence or non-
existence that he expresses or implies, or (c) knows that he does not have the basis
that he states or implies he has for his belief.
34 ALI Federal Securities Code, § 251A (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) (Comment 3).
35 478 F.2d at 123-24.
38 188 F.2d 783, 786; see text accompanying note 6, supra.
37 A. BROMBERG, .rupra note 13, § 8.4(110).
Professor Loss states:
A number of cases have required some showing of "fraud." The leading case in
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prised of the same elements as is common law fraud, except that anzin-
tent to harm, while a necessary element of common law fraud, is not an
ingredient of reckless disregard for the truth. Consequently, a person
who has acted with reckless disregard for the truth in failing to disclose
information or in disclosing misleading information would have been
conscious of the misstatements or omissions, but would not have in-
tended that harm result to the prospective investors. Indeed he may
have even been hopeful that no harm would have followed, or merely
disregarded the possibility that investors might be misled.38
Third, there are indications of the acceptance of a negligence stan-
dard in Franchard; the language which the court expressly said would
correctly allege a violation of rule 10b-5 in private actions for damages
amounts to negligence according to Comment (4) of the ALI defini-
tion of "knowledge." 9  Comment (4) states that when a negligence
standard is desired, the phrase to be used is "knowledge or reasonable
grounds to believe." Despite its announced rejection of the negligence
standard, this language was used by the Franchard court when it stated
this camp is Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co. [Citation omitted]. See also . . .
Trussel v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 75"7, 771-72 (D. Colo. 1964),
... (the statutory language "implies conduct which is at the very least, either know.
ing or intentional, although reckless disregard of the truth may suffice without ac-
tual knowledge.").
L. LOSS, supra note 13, at 3885 (emphasis supplied).
As will be seen below, the court appears to relax the standard to more closely represent
mere disregard" for the truth rather than "reckless disregard." It is doubtful, nevertheless,
that the trial court ascribed the same meaning to the words as did the Second Citcult.
The court's dissatisfaction with the plaintiffs attorneys may well have spurred the court
to accept the "reckless disregard" standard, yet with its heretofore unexpressed liberalized
interpretation. The court stated: "This is a striking example of a case that never should
have been claimed for a jury trial, as plaintiffs' counsel did. That, coupled with what
appears to have been a lack of preparation in addition to visibly inept trial conduct on
the part of plaintiffs' counsel, is about all that distinguishes this from what otherwise would
be an uncomplicated appeal." 478 F.2d at 117. See also, id. at 120.22, 125.
38The Restatement of Torts suggests that recklessness dilfers from intentional misconduct
(fraud) in that the person did not intend the harm to result:
While an act to be reckless must be intended by the actor, the actor does not intend
to cause the harm which results from it. It is enough that he realizes or, from the
facts which he knows, should realize that harm may result, even though he hopes
or even expects that his conduct will prove harmless.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, EXPLANATORY NOTES § 500, comment f at 1296 (1934). See
also Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Pris'ity and State of Mind in Rule
lob-5 Purchase and Sales Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 423,436 (1968):
If he has no intent to injure, he may nevertheless know the existence of the true
facts. In such a case if he makes a misrepresentation or fails to disclose, his con.
duct is "knowing" in the sense that he acts in the belief that investors may be mis.
led by his misrepresentations or nondisclosures. His conduct will be "reckless" If
he acts in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, the risk that they will be mis.
led.
39ALI Federal Securities Code, § 251A (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) (Comment 4).
that for a plaintiff to recover in a private rule 10b-5 suit for damages he
must prove either (1) that the defendant knew of the material misstate-
ment or omission, or (2) that he "failed or refused to ascertain and dis-
close such facts when they were readily available to him and he had
reasonable grounds to believe that they existed."40
The "negligence" language probably carries more significance than
the other language of the court since the court expressly stated that the
"reasonable grounds to believe" test was the correct standard for deter-
mining liability. But when the court combines this language with that
of "reckless disregard for the truth" and "some form of scienter" it
indicates that negligence does-yet does not-suffice for a private plain-
tiff to recover damages under rule lob-5.
The apparent contradiction may be resolved by differentiating between
"negligence" and "mere negligence," since it was "mere negligence" that
the court had repeatedly rejected 1 The analysis will illustrate that
the Second Circuit appears to be groping toward an inquiry notice stan-
dard.42
Acts that constitute negligence depend on the exisence of a legal duty
and the breach or failure to carry out that duty with the exercise of
reasonable care.4 3 Consequently, when the nature of the duty is altered,
the meaning of negligence naturally changes also. "Mere negligence"
is characterized by (1) the existence of an affirmative duty to investigate
material matters despite the non-existence of facts which would have
put the defendants on notice as to any misstatements or omissions, and
(2) the failure by the defendants to carry out the duty with reasonable
care. The plaintiffs in Franchard, by requesting the establishment of an
affirmative duty to investigate, therefore, requested a charge of "mere
40 478 F. 2d at 123 (emphasis supplied).
4 1 See, e.g., Republic Technology Fund, Inc. v. The Lionel Corp., 483 F.2d 540, 551
(2d Cir. 1973) ("something more than 'mere' negligence"); Gerstle v. Gamble.Skogmo, Inc.,
478 F.2d 1281, 1301 n.20 (2d Cir. 1973) ("whether it was willfully misleading or merely
negligently drafted"); Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341,
397 (2d Cir. 1973) ("purpose was not to punish mere negligence"); Cohen v. Franchard
Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 123 (2d Cir. 1973) ("We uniformly have held that a party cannot
be held liable in a private suit for damages under Rule 10b-5 mere negligent conduct.");
SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 n.15 (2d Cir. 1972) ("more
than mere negligence is required"); Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442,
445 (2d Cir. 1971) ("It is insufficient to allege mere negligence"); Globus v. Law Research
Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1290 (2d Cir. 1969) ("some form of scienter greater than
mere negligence was required") (emphasis supplied in all examples).
42 The concept of "inquiry notice" was discussed by Professor Shipman as applied to
the standard of conduct for attorneys under § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. Shipman,
The Need for SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys ulier
the Federal Securities Statutes, 34 Onto ST. L.J. 231, 266-69 (1973) (inquiry notice "requires
one to investigate possible defects concerning which he has been put on notice").
43W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS 143 (4th ed. 1971).
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negligence," which the court rejected. 4  "Negligence," on the other
hand, as stated by Comment (4) to the ALI definition of "knowledge,"
cited in Franchard, is the equivalent of "inquiry notice." Inquiry notice
does not establish an affirmative duty to investigate. The duty to in-
vestigate arises only when the defendants are in some manner put on
notice of the possible existence of material misstatements or omissions,
that is, when they have reasonable grounds to believe that the misstate-
ments or omissions exist. Consequently, by defining the correct test as
whether the defendants had "reasonable grounds to believe" that a mis-
statement or omission exists, the Franchard court appears to have es.
tablished an inquiry notice standard. It would be advisable, however,
not to speak in terms of "negligence," since use of the term results only
in confusion. Instead, language should be framed in terms of the exis.
tence of a duty and the breach of the duty.45
2. Lanza v. Drexel & Co.
The more recent case Lanza v. Drexel & Co.40 clarifies the Second
Circuit's acceptance 0f the inquiry notice test and in doing so significantly
expands the meaning of "reckless disregard for the truth." Lanza in-
volved the liability of an outside director for failing to investigate and
disclose the inaccuracy or omission of material matters in information
conveyed to plaintiff, a prospective investor. The critical information
that was not provided to plaintiff was the deteriorating financial stability
of the corporation he was buying into. The court adopted as its scien-
ter standard the requirement for defendant to have acted in "reckless
disregard for the truth." It then held that although the outside director
knew of the financial problems of the corporation and of the accom-
panying internal strife, he was not liable for reckless disregard for the
truth because this. knowledge was not sufficient to put him on notice
that the insiders had withheld the information from the plaintiff.4
Lanza differs from Franchard in that Franchard dealt with insider
conduct. Insiders are generally held to a higher standard of conduct
than outsiders;48 consequently, if the inquiry notice standard is adopted
to judge the conduct of outsiders in Lanza, a standard at least as stringent
should apply to the insiders in Franchard. However, the Second Cir-
cuit does not distinguish between outside corporate officials and inside
44 478 F.2d at 123.
45 The Ninth Circuit in White v. Abrams, 42 U.S.L.W. 2518 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 1974)
adopted a similar analysis.
46479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
47 Id. at 1288, 1306-09.
48 Cf. Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 687-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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officers and directors in determining the applicable rule 10b-5 standard
of conduct; the same test would be applied to both types of defendants.
It is logical that an outside director would be less likely to be found liable
under an inquiry notice standard than an insider, simply because an in-
sider, involved in the day-to-day operations of the corporation, is put on
notice of a much larger volume of material information, including pos-
sible misstatements or omissions, than an outsider. Nevertheless, the
inquiry notice standard appears to apply both to insiders and outsiders.
If the inquiry notice test applied only to outsiders, while a more se-
vere test applied to insiders, the logical result would appear to be a re-
turn to the imposition on insiders of an affirmative duty to investigate
(negligence). The adoption of an affirmative duty to investigate was
urged in dicta in TGS, but was dearly rejected in subsequent cases.4'
Lanza, while refusing to impose liability on an outside director because
he was not aware of the inaccurate disclosure, did not state that the
insiders were liable under a stricter standard." It indicated that the
insiders had knowledge of the misstatements and omissions conveyed
to plaintiff.51 This conduct easily fits within the inquiry notice standard,
since inquiry notice is comprised of both actual knowledge of misstate-
ments or omissions and information sufficient to make defendants aware
that such misstatements or omissions might exist.
After the Lanza court affirmed a charge requiring reckless disregard
for the truth by defendant in order for liability to arise it defined reck-
less disregard for the truth and included inquiry notice in the definition:
In determining what constitutes "willful or reckless disregard for the
truth" the inquiry normally will be to determine whether the defendants
knew the material facts misstated or omitted, or failed or refused, after
being put on notice of a possible material failure of disclosure, to ap-
prise themselves of the facts where they could have done so without ex-
traordinary effort.52
The Lanza definition indicates two things. First, it expressly supports
the inquiry notice standard suggested by Franchard; it negates the exis-
tence of a general affirmative duty to investigate and requires such in-
49 See text accompanying notes 12-24, supra.
50479 F.2d at 1280, 1305-06, 1306 n.98 (the court discusses the reckless disregard
standard and does nor indicate that different standards apply to outsiders than to insiders).
5l Id. at 1280. The court stressed that the outside director, unlike the insiders, was
not present at the meetings in which negotiations with plaintiffs for an exchange of stock
in the two corporations was carried on, and, consequently, unlike the insiders was not aware
of the information inaccurately conveyed to plaintiffs. The court also pointed out that the
insiders were aware of the decrease in financial stability of the corporation of which the
defendant was a director. Id. at 1283-89.
52 Id. at 1306 n.98 (emphasis added).
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vestigation only when information sufficient to put a defendant on notice
of the possibility of a material misstatement or omission arises. Sec-
ond, it significantly liberalizes the interpretation of "reckless disregard
for the truth," 3 and thereby releases it from the near fraud definition
provided in Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.54
The apparent contradictions of Franchard can now be harmonized
in light of Lanza. Since "reckless disregard" can now be treated in the
Second Circuit as the equivalent of inquiry notice, the contradiction be-
tween the Franchard acc-ptance of both the reckless disregard and rea-
sonable grounds to believe (inquiry notice) language disappears. Fur.
ther, the Franchard court did not incorporate the ALI definition of
"knowledge" in express terms, indicating possible slight differences be-
tween the court's "some degree of knowledge" and the ALI definition.
"Some degree of knowledge" could, therefore, be viewed as equivalent
to inquiry notice. Consequently, the language in Franchard which
seemed to indicate fraud, negligence, and some middle ground (some
form of scienter or knowledge) can be harmonized as being equivalent
to inquiry notice.
While Lanza confirms the inquiry notice standard in the Second Cir-
cuit, the dissenting opinion of Judge Timbers in Lanza suggests a possible
shift of focus in the debate over the applicable standard. Me stated
that it would be unnecessary in Lanza to determine whether an affirma-
tive duty to investigate should be established. The facts in the case
viewed as a whole, Judge Timbers asserted, were sufficient to put the de-
fendant-director on "notice," and consequently he should have been
held liable for "reckless disregard for the truth." Judge Timbers con-
sidered that the expertise and experience of -the defendant, combined
with the fact that the corporation suffered many business reversals in
the past and was presently experiencing significant internal strife,
should have placed the defendant-director on notice to investigate and
determine whether material information was withheld from the plain-
tiffs."5 Consequently, the struggle within the Second Circuit may in fu-
ture cases shift from the debate over negligence versus scienter to con-
cern over the type of conduct that constitutes the minimum degree of
notice that is required to establish a duty to investigate. It would be
53 See text accompanying notes 35-38, supra. The original meaning of reckless dlsregard
is comprised of knowledge of misstatements or omissions, but without the intent to harm,
and with conscious disregard of the possible harm that might result. Inquiry notice, however,
reflects a situation where a person does not know of the misstatements or omissions, but
receives information to make him aware that possible inaccuracies or omissions may have
occurred.
54 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
S5479 F.2d at 1320-22 (dissenting opinion).
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mere speculation to suggest how far Judge Timbers would go in deter-
mining what constitutes notice; however, his minimal requirements
might possibly approach "mere negligence" which the court in the past
has disapproved. Judge Hays' dissent argued for the imposition of a
positive duty on the defendant to investigate, without a notice require-
ment.56
III. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S
ADOPTION OF THE INQUIRY NOTICE STANDARD
The inquiry notice standard, as stated above, would not establish an
affirmative duty to investigate. Such a duty would arise only when suf-
ficent information has come to the attention of a corporate officer or
director to place him on notice of the existence of possible material mis-
statements or omissions. Inquiry notice stands in contrast to the negli-
gence standard approved by the Seventh Circuit to cover private rule
lob-5 actions for damages2T That circuit has suggested a standard
which would establish an affirmative duty to investigate, thereby creating
a form of fiduciary relationship between corporate personnel and pro-
spective investors which imposes a greater duty on them than merely
to abstain from fraudulent practices. The duty is required to be exer-
cised with "reasonable and due diligence" to ascertain what is material
and would affect the judgment of prospective investors. Whether the
"reasonable and due diligence" requirement has been met would de-
pend on the totality of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
The actual business skill of the corporate officer or director and the nor-
mal business acumen of one in the position of the officer or director
would constitute prime factors in determining whether the duty was
performed with reasonable careY8
The Second Circuit, as illustrated above, has rejected the imposition
upon corporate personnel of an affirmative duty to investigate and has
6 Id. at 13 17-20 (dissenting opinion).
Note that four judges dissented from the majority and would impose a negligence stan-
dard upon defendant conduct in private rule 10b-5 actions for damages. The split in the
Second Circuit, therefore, remains 5-4 opposed to a negligence standard, just as in TGS.
See note 25, supra. See also White v. Abrams, 42 U.S.LW. 2518 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 1974).
57 See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
58 Id. at 641-42.
The Seventh Circuit also indicated that the fulfillment of fair and honest business prac-
tices in a spirit of good faith under all circumstances would be an overriding consideration.
However, the court did not mean to suggest good faith in the sense of inaction due to
the non-existence of a situation which would place an insider on inquiry notice (good faith
in investigating only subsequent to inquiry notice); rather it referred to good faith in aggres-
sively seeking out any material matter that might affect an investment decision. Presumably
the absence of good faith could be inferred from the lack of diligence or reasonable care
in exercising the duty to investigate.
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established an inquiry notice standard of conduct in private rule 10b-5
actions for damages. This section of the note attempts to analyze the
various considerations which have lead the Second Circuit to adopt an
inquiry notice test and to reject the imposition of an affirmative duty
to investigate. It also attempts to raise and answer certain objections
which the Second Circuit has asserted in rejecting a negligence standard.
Finally, this section suggests a primary policy consideration which the
Second Circuit has overlooked in accepting inquiry notice as its standard
of conduct in private rule 10b-5 actions for damages.
A. Considerations Supporting Inquiry Notice
1. Fear of Unlimited Liability
The decision by the Second Circuit in Franchard and Lanza not to
place an affirmative duty to investigate upon corporate personnel ap-
pears to be traceable to the fear of creating potential unlimited liability."0
As the Second Circuit stated in Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Air-
craft Corp.,60 the requirement of some degree of scienter functions to
impose liability on those whose conduct has been sufficiently culpable
to justify the penalty.6' When a person has been placed on notice of
the possible existence of material misstatements or omissions, a court will
be less reluctant to impose potentially unlimited liability since the de-
fendant has had the opportunity to investigate such matters, and failure
to do so would reflect the defendant's own culpability or some degree
of bad faith. When a person acts in good faith, however, and only
through negligence overlooks material information, his conduct is much
less blameworthy. In such a case liability might be imposed without
hesitation if the possibility of unlimited liability were slight. However,
in a rule 10b-5 case where thousands of investors and millions of dollars
might be involved in a damage action, a court might be extremely re-
luctant to create liability without some degree of bad faith. This rea-
soning provides a compelling argument for the inquiry notice standard.
Yet the Second Circuit might appropriately reach an opposite conclu-
sion and impose an affirmative duty to investigate if some means were
available to spread or limit the risk. There are several approaches which
could be taken to reach this result, the first of which is the availability
59Judge Friendly expressed this concern in his concurring opinion in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 866-69 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Gerstle v, Gable-
Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300 (2d Cir. 1973).
60480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973).
61ld. at 363.
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of insurance to protect corporate directors and management, thereby
spreading the risk and allowing compensation to the injured victim with-
out fear of placing unlimited liability on any one individual.6 2
The proposed ALI Federal Securities Code approaches the matter in
another way. It would limit, in certain situations, the maximum civil
liability which could be imposed on each defendant to either out of
pocket damages or to an arbitrary dollar ceiling, except when it is shown
that the defendant made the misrepresentations with knowledge of the
misstatement.63 Of course congressional action would be required before
such an arbitrary limit could be set.
The probability of liability could also be limited by moderating the
effects of a more liberal standard of conduct with a stricter test for ma-
teriality. Such an approach would require a factor to be more decisive
and influential in the making of an investment decision in order to be
material. The result would be to assure that liability would not attach
if minor or less influential items were overlooked by a corporate director
or officer.
Indeed, the Second Circuit realized in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogro,
Inc.,4 that when a negligence test (affirmative duty to investigate) is
adopted, a strict materiality standard is necessary. 5 Gerstle involved
a violation of rule 14a-9 which deals with proxy statement solicitation.
The court established that in a rule 14a-9 suit, unlike a rule 10b-5 action,
negligence is a sufficient basis for recovery, and corporate officers and di-
rectors will be held to an affirmative duty to investigate.6 The court
stated that when a more liberal standard of culpability is involved, and
when there is a possibility of heavy damages, a stricter definition of ma-
teriality is necessary.6"
The court in Gerstle did not clarify, however, whether the logical
result of its statement would be a less severe materiality test under the
rule 10b-5 inquiry notice standard. It may be very likely that the same
fear of heavy damages would prompt the court to establish the more de-
manding materiality standard in rule 10b-5 as well as rule 14a-9 actions.
6 2 See Note, Insuring Corporate Executives Against Uability Under Rule lOb.5: First
Principles and Second Thoughts, 63 NW. U.L. REV. 544 (1968). For a discussion on the
impact of insurance on the law of torts, see W. PROSSEt, LAW oF Torrs 547-56 (4th
ed. 1971).
6 ALI Federal Securities Code, § 1403 (g) (2) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
64478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
65Id. at 1301-03.
66Id. at 1298-1301.
67 Id. at 1302.
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2. Deterrence of Fraudulent Conduct
The Second Circuit views the primary policy goal of rule lob-5 to be
the deterrence of fraudulent conduct."' The court feels that fraudulent
activity cannot be prevented more effectively by a negligence standard
(an affirmative duty to investigate) than by a standard requiring at
least some degree of knowledge of the misstatement or omission.00 This
is because a negligence standard assumes that the defendant has acted
in good faith, and although he has in fact acted in good faith, he may
still be found liable if he did not exercise reasonable care in carrying
out the investigation.7" Deterrence of fraudulent conduct, however, as
stated by the Second Circuit in Chris-Craft, is aimed at some degree of
culpable conduct.7' The Lanza court stated that it read the purpose of
the rule as deterrence of fraudulent or predatory practices on the part of
corporate personnel.72  It indicated that complete good faith is a valid
defense to a rule 10b-5 private action for damages.78
The Second Circuit feels that the inquiry notice test rests on the
fringe of fraudulent conduct. Since actual fraudulent intent is not re-
quired,- but some degree of culpable conduct is still involved, the deter-
rent aspect of the rule is furthered to the maximum extent by this stan-
dard. As stated above, however, negligence involves no greater know-
ing culpability than does inquiry notice. Consequently, the court feels
that a negligence standard (an affirmative duty to investigate) would
not further the deterrence goal of rule 10b-5.
3. A Statutory Impediment
Irrespective of policy considerations, the Second Circuit rests its in-
quiry notice requirement on a statutory basis. If. feels that regardless of
other policy considerations, the wording of § 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 prevents it from establishing an affirmative duty to
investigate. The court stated in Lanza v. Drexel & Co. that the words
in § 10(b) prohibiting the use of any "manipulative or deceptive devices"
68 Deterrence has long been a purpose of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. See, e.g., A. BROM-
BIERG, supra note 13, § 8.4 (508), at 204.114.
69 479 F.2d at 1298-1305.
70 When negligence is advanced as a basis for liability in non-privity trading cases,
not only is the defendant's conduct based upon a less objectionable state of mind,
but the deterrent effect of potential liability is weaker [than it is when some degree
of knowledge is required] because under the assumptions employed here the de.
fendant has made a good faith attempt to comply with his duties.
Ruder, supra note 13, at 442.
71480 F.2d at 363.
72479 F.2d at 1289-91.
73 Id. at 1300.
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negate liability for "mere negligence." 74  It further indicated in Gerstle
v. Gamble-Skogmo Corp. that to read a negligence requirement into
rule 10b-5 would exceed the SEC's authority stemming from § 10(b).5
The court indicated that "manipulative" and "deceptive" denote active
misrepresentation which necessarily involves some degree of knowledge
of the existence of misstatements or omissions in investment literature.
Consequently, the court believed that inquiry notice is as far as rule 10b-
5 liability can be extended in private actions for damages and yet fall
within § 10(b)'s authority.7"
Technically, the court's interpretation of these words would appear to
be correct. However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that §
10(b) and rule 10b-5 must be read flexibly, not technically and restric-
tively, to effectuate their broad remedial purposes.7T  The Second Cir-
cuit in Lanza purported to be following these guidelines in establishing
the inquiry notice standard.78 The Supreme Court, however, seems to
reject the narrow interpretation given to "any manipulative and decep-
tive devices," and appears to follow the interpretation of the Ninth Cir-
cuit.79 In Ellis v. Carter,"0 the Ninth Circuit suggested that it would be
74M. at 1305.
75 478 F.2d at 1298-99.
76 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) (§ 10(b)):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(a) - ..
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of investors.
(c).-.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) (rule 10b-5):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
of instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum.
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
77 See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 185 (1963);
Tcherepain v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); Superintendent v. Bankers Life & Casual.
ty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
78 479 F.2d at 1299.
" Affiliated UteCitizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1971):
These proscriptions, by statute and rule, are broad and, by repeated use of the
word "any," are obviously meant to be inclusive.... Congress intended securities
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difficult to frame the SEC's authority to promulgate rules and regula-
tions, such as rule lob-5, in broader terms than § 10(b)'s "any manipu-
lative or deceptive devices or contrivances," and that the authority to en-
act rule 10b-5 was therefore present.8'
Indeed, the Second Circuit was reversed by the Supreme Court in
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. for technical rather than
flexible construction although the Second Circuit in the Capital Gains
case, as it did in Lanza, purported to be construing broadly to effectuate
the remedial purposes of the securities acts.8 2  The Capital Gains case
involved the interpretation of "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" in
the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.s8 The Supreme Court stated that
these words, which are similar to those of § 10(b), were not to be read,
as the Second Circuit had read them, in light of the traditional common
law concepts of fraud and deceit.84  Nevertheless, the concept of fraud
has caused the Second Circuit to refrain from establishing an affirmative
duty to investigate in a private rule 10b-5 action for damages.
B. Second Circuit Objections to a Negligence Standard
In addition to the factors which urged the Second Circuit to adopt an
inquiry notice standard, there are additional factors which led the circuit
to reject the imposition of an affirmative duty to investigate (a negli-
gence standard). One such reason was stated by the court in Lanza v.
Drexel & Co. to be the impossibility of investigating every person and
thing connected with a particular transaction.8" The court suggested
that it would be unduly burdensome to require a director, particularly an
outside director, to delve into all aspects of corporate business in order to
avail himself of any material information which should be disclosed.
The flaw in the court's reasoning, however, is that it apparently failed
to realize that if an affirmative duty to investigate were adopted, as ex-
emplified by the standard approved by the Seventh Circuit, the exercise
of the duty would require only due diligence or reasonable care. If after
the exercise of due diligence a material misstatement or omission had
arisen, a defendant would not be liable to injured investors. The court's
concern might be valid if it were speaking to a standard of strict liability,
legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed "not techni-
cally and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes."
80291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
81 Id. at 274 (emphasis supplied).
82 375 U.S. at 185.
83 15 U.S.C. § 80b.
84 375 U.S. at 185.
85 479 F.2d at 1307-08.
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which would hold the defendant liable regardless of the exercise of due
diligence or reasonable care. But strict liability has not been discussed
as a possible standard of conduct within the Second Circuit.
Another objection has been raised by the Second Circuit in opposi-
tion to the establishment of an affirmative duty to investigate. There
is a fear expressed that a corporate outside director, one not directly in-
volved in the day-to-day management of a corporation, might unfairly be
subjected to liability.8G The standard suggested by the Seventh Circuit
and discussed above answers that objection. 7 It would limit liability
of outside directors since the "normal business acumen" of one in that
position would be relevant in determining a violation of rule 10b-5, and
because the normal business acumen of an outside director would not
be as extensive as that of the management personnel of the corporation.
Consequently, the degree and thoroughness of investigation required on
the part of an outside director would be significantly lower than that
required by an insider, and therefore liability would less readily attach
to an outsider.88
C. Encouragement of Full Disclosure
Significantly, the Second Circuit, in establishing an inquiry notice
standard of conduct in private rule lob-5 actions for damages, has not
focused upon one important purpose of the securities acts as set forth
by the Supreme Court-encouragement of full disclosure."  The Su-
preme Court has found that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 "quite
clearly falls into the category of remedial legislation."'  Consequently,
the Court has expressed the belief that "One of its central purposes is
to protect investors through the requirement of full disclosure . ,
8 6 See, e.g., 479 F.2d at 1281.
87 See text accompanying note 57, supr.88 While the establishment of an affirmative duty to investigate on the part of outsiders
would appear to place a higher duty of care upon them than would inquiry notice, it should
be noted that the same result is not necessarily true with regard to insiders. Since an insider
encounters a great mass of information in carrying out his day-to-day affairs it normally
would be rare for him not to have been put on notice as to the existence of material
information. Consequently, the effect would normally be the same as if the insider was
held to an affirmative duty to investigate. Franchard, however, does illustrate the exception
to this proposition. There the defendant insiders were found not to be liable when measured
by an inquiry notice standard since they were not placed on notice of the financial instability
of the parmership's net lessee. 478 F.2d at 123-24. If, however, the defendants were
required to affirmatively investigate they presumably would have been held liable if it were
found that they had not investigated with reasonable care.
89 The principle of encouragement of full disclosure of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 was stated by the Court in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180, 186 (1963), and was restated in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
90 Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
91 Id.
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This goal would be more adequately met by the requirement of an affir-
mative duty to investigate.
It was noted above that inquiry notice promotes to the fullest extent
the deterrence of fraudulent conduct. 2  However, inquiry notice would
not significantly promote full disclosure since it does not require a cor-
porate officer or director to seek out and disclose material information.
It creates a passive duty the goal of which is to deter undesirable con-
duct rather than to promote desireable conduct.Y3 An affirmative duty
to investigate does stimulate desired conduct and therefore more ade-
quately meets the goal of encouragement of full disclosure.
The positive effects of an affirmative duty to investigate can be il-
lustrated by referring to the facts in Cohen v. Franchard Corp.04 If a
policy were adopted to encourage disclosure, the Franchard plaintiffs
might have been warned of the financial instability of the net lessee and
consequently might not have been involved in litigation. When a lessor,
here Associates, embarks upon a long term net lease involving such a
large sum of money, it is not only concerned with the prospective return
on its investment, but also With the ability of the net lessee to pay the
agreed upon rental rate, i.e. the lessee's financial stability. The loss to
current investors of the lessor company when its management fails to in-
vestigate would undoubtedly fall within the Supreme Court's admonition
that one cannot be held liable under rule 10b-5 for mere negligent cor-
porate mismanagement. 5 However, a lessor also realizes that prospective
investors are relying upon it to furnish them with material information,
and that knowledge of the financial stability or instability of the lessee
may significantly affect a decision to invest. By demanding that a cor-
porate officer investigate, discovery of this type of information would
be encouraged. Of course, this reasoning is not limited to lessor-lessee
relationships. It applies to all investment opportunities. Since corporate
personnel have greater access to information than prospective investors,
an affirmative duty to investigate would encourage full disclosure by
requiring the corporate officer or director to seek out and convey material
matters to the investing public, thereby putting prospective investors on
a more equal footing with corporate personnel.
92 See discussion following text accompanying note 73, .upra.
93 See A. BROMBERG, rupra note 13, § 8.4(508) at 204.114-15; Ruder, tuprd note 13,
at 44 1.
94 478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1973).
95"*... Congress by § 10(b) did not seek to regulate transactions which constitute
no more than internal corporate mismanagement." Superintendent v. Bankers Life & Casu-
alty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
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Ill. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit, after initially rejecting a fraud requirement and
appearing to establish a negligence standard in rule lob-5 private actions
for damages, then engaged in a retreat from negligence. Now it ap-
pears to have solidified its position and to have adopted an inquiry notice
standard, which places a duty upon corporate personnel to investigate
material information only after having received information sufficient to
put them on notice as to possible material misstatements or omissions in
investment literature.
A statutory impediment-the reading by the court of § 10(b) as re-
quiring some form of fraudulent conduct to give rise to liability in private
rule 10b-5 damage actions-prevails as the primary factor preventing
the Second Circuit from establishing an affirmative duty to invO6tigate.
However, if the words construed in the Capital Gains case have been
liberated from their common law confines, there appears to be no reason
to require § 10(b)'s "manipulative and deceptive devices" to be viewed
in light of traditional concepts of common law fraud and therefore to
require "some form of scienter." The Second Circuit should, therefore,
free itself from its self-imposed statutory restrictions and proceed to con-
sider more fully, in light of the Supreme Court's rulings, the relevant
policy considerations.
James R. Shenk
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